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This article contends that what appear to be the dystopic conditions of affective capitalism 
are just as likely to be felt in various joyful encounters as they are in atmospheres of fear 
associated with post 9/11 securitization. Rather than grasping joyful encounters with 
capitalism as an ideological trick working directly on cognitive systems of belief, the 
article approaches them as a repressive affective relation a population establishes 
between politicized sensory environments and what Deleuze and Guattari (1994) call a 
brain-becoming-subject. This is a radical relationality (Protevi, 2010) understood here as 
a mostly nonconscious brain-somatic process of subjectification occurring in contagious 
sensory environments populations become politically situated in. The joyful encounter is 
not therefore merely an ideological manipulation of belief, but following Gabriel Tarde, 
belief is always the object of desire. The article discusses various manifestations of 
affective capitalism and repressive political affects that prompt an initial question 
concerning what can be done to a brain so that it involuntarily conforms to the joyful 
encounter. The article also frames a second question concerning what can a brain do, and 
discusses how affect theory can conceive of a brain-somatic relation to sensory 
environments that might be freed from its coincidence with capitalism. The second 
question not only leads to a different kind of illusion to that understood as a product of 
an ideological trick, but also abnegates a model of the brain, which limits subjectivity in 
the making to a phenomenological inner self or Being in the world. 
Introduction 
To develop a theoretical understanding of the dystopic conditions of affective 
capitalism we will need to grasp its various manifestations in everyday life. The 
most recent and conspicuous of these appearances is perhaps Facebook’s 
notorious attempt to engineer the emotions of their users (Kramer et al., 2014). 
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In 2014, Facebook carried out an experiment involving the manipulation of the 
emotional content of posts and measuring the effect these manipulations had on 
the emotions of 689,003 of its users in terms of how contagious they became. 
The researchers who carried out the experiment found that when they reduced 
the positive expressions displayed by other users they produced less positive 
posts and more posts that are negative. Likewise, when negative expressions were 
reduced, the opposite pattern occurred. The rather paltry findings of the study led 
the researchers to conclude that the ‘emotions expressed by others on Facebook 
influence our own emotions, constituting experimental evidence for massive-
scale contagion via social networks’ (ibid.).  
Emotional contagion is not an exceptional concept in science or philosophy. 
Indeed, aside from much recent neuroscientific work in this area, we can also 
look back to Hume’s understanding of sympathy as a sort of early philosophy of 
emotional contagion (Ellis and Tucker, 2015: 63-64). So even if this contentious 
attempt by Facebook to influence moods produced meagre evidence of 
contagion, the design and implementation of the experiment itself should 
perhaps alert us to a potentially Huxleyesque mode of mass manipulation. 
Nicholas Carr (2014) described it accordingly as a ‘bulletin from a dystopian 
future’. Moreover, the dubiously titled research paper that followed 
(‘Experimental evidence of massive-scale emotional contagion through social 
networks’) draws attention to how the social media business enterprise’s 
cultivation of big data flouts ethical considerations. In their endeavour to 
engineer emotional contagion the Facebook researchers did not ask for consent 
or refrain from involving minors in the experiment. In effect, they treated their 
users like lab rats (Carr, 2014: webpage). However, what is more concerning 
about this study, as Carr contends, ‘lay not in its design or its findings, but in its 
ordinariness’ (ibid.). This kind of research is, it would appear, the social media 
business norm; part of a ‘visible tip of an enormous and otherwise well-concealed 
iceberg’ (ibid.) in the industry. To be sure, the one thing that both the disparagers 
and apologists of Facebook seem to agree on is that user manipulation is rife on 
the internet.  
This article begins by expanding on Carr’s dystopic assessment of the Facebook 
experiment by briefly asking what we can learn about affective capitalism from 
the aesthetic figures that populate Aldous Huxley’s notion of soft control. In 
Brave new world and Brave new world revisited (originally published in 1932 and 
1958 respectively) Huxley presents a comparable model of control that taps 
directly into the affective states of the brain-somatic relations of a population 
engaged in everyday joyful encounters. In Brave new world joy is triggered by the 
drug Soma which is consumed along with the hypnopaedic rhythms of ‘beating 
of drums…plangently repeated and repeated’ so that they quell any misguided 
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thoughts of nonconformity (Huxley, 2007: 69). Huxley’s joyful encounter is, it 
would seem, an affective manipulation that exploits bodily desires in order to 
influence belief in the political new order. He writes that it was not ‘the ear that 
heard the pulsing rhythm, it was the midriff; the wail and clang of those 
recurring harmonies haunted, not the mind, but the yearning bowels of 
compassion’ (ibid.). Although the widespread proliferation of drugs like Prozac 
and Ritalin have prompted some authors to draw comparisons between Huxley’s 
dystopia and the present day (Rose, 2005), I will argue here that Huxley’s 
rhythmic entrainment of somatic desire and belief are comparable to more 
generalized mechanisms of control in times of affective capitalism. 
Mechanisms of control are grasped here through the many interferences that crop 
up between current scientific emotion research and Huxley’s dystopian novel and 
help us to address a question concerning what can be done to a brain so that 
beliefs can be manipulated by way of appeals to desire. Moreover, rather than 
grasping these repressive joyful encounters with capitalism as a mere ideological 
trick working directly on cognitive systems of belief, they are conceived of as 
occurring in the affective relations a population establishes between politicized 
sensory environments and what Deleuze and Guattari (1994) call a brain-
becoming-subject. This is a radical relationality (Protevi, 2010), understood in this 
context as a mostly nonconscious brain-somatic process of subjectification 
happening in the contagious sensory environments populations become 
politically situated in. The joyful encounter does not therefore simply function in 
ideological registers, but following Gabriel Tarde (as developed in Sampson, 
2012), belief is always grasped as the object of desire. 
Attention is accordingly turned toward other manifestations of affective 
capitalism; beginning with the so-called emotional turn in the neurosciences, 
which is increasingly influencing how marketers and political strategists, for 
example, target affective brain-somatic states in an effort to manipulate the mood 
of a population. So-called neuromarketers are, like this, adopting novel tools, like 
Galvanic Skin Response (GSR) and electroencephalography (EEG), that can 
supposedly correlate bodily arousal and the modulating rhythm of a brainwave to 
salient consumer emotions implicated in, for example, empathy toward brands 
leading to purchase decisions (Vecchiato et al., 2011). Likewise, researchers in the 
US are using MRI scans to speculate on the differences between political 
preferences according to parts of the brain implicated in social connectedness 
(Science Daily, 2012). While clearly acknowledging the speculative nature of the 
claims of these commercial and political offshoots of the neurosciences, I 
contend that the emotional turn opens up a second unignorable question 
concerning what can a brain do.  
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Before even beginning to approach this second question, we need to grasp a 
historical trajectory of the joyful encounter and in particular its modern origins 
in fascism. Here I want to draw specific attention to the significance of what we 
might call a double event of affect implicated in the political control of the sensory 
environments in which brains (and bodies) become subjectified. This is a double 
capacity to affect and be affected by events (e.g. Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 257). 
Beginning with John Protevi’s (2010) analysis of passive and active affective 
registers in the joyful encounters with the far right of the 1930s, the discussion 
moves on to look at more recent manifestations of a right wing political affect 
that are once again spreading across Europe. To be sure, grasping the affective 
capacities of the brain-somatic relation to contemporary sensory environments 
becomes imperative, I contend, to understanding the various social, cultural and 
biological triggers for this current wave of right wing populism.  
This second question is further approached via Catherine Malabou’s (2009) 
effort to draw on the neurosciences to grasp how to free the brain from its 
coincidence with capitalism. Indeed, by re-appropriating the emotional turn, 
Malabou conceives of a plastic brain that is already free, but through a circuitous 
convergence between capitalism and neuroscience becomes trapped in the model 
of a flexible brain. In short, flexibility is for Malabou the ‘ideological avatar’ that 
hides the potential of neuronal plasticity to be free (ibid.: 12). Here I will similarly 
expand on possible alternatives to a mode of capitalism that increasingly targets 
noncognitive brain functioning by, firstly, exploring the radical relationality 
established between brains, bodies and sensory environments (Protevi, 2010), 
and secondly, grasping the rhythmic composition of imitative encounters (Borch, 
2005) that position subjectivities. This is an appeal to an affective relationality 
that crucially does not coincide with the sense of the inner world of subjective 
experience Malabou seems to refer to, but points instead to a brain-becoming-
subject composed of relations. As Protevi describes it, ‘we do not “have” 
relations, but we are relations all the way down’ (2010: 174). Indeed, the 
theoretical potency of concepts like joyful encounters, radical relationality and 
brain-somatic relations is that they help us to rethink power relations by 
circumventing a phenomenological worldview determined by subjective personal 
experience of external reality alone. Again, following Deleuze and Guattari’s 
(1994) appeal to neurology we find an alternative to Malabou’s synaptic essence 
of self; that is to say, a mind that needs to know what is inside our brain so as to 
reveal who ‘We’ are (Malabou, 2009: 3). Unlike the phenomenologist’s person 
who thinks beyond the brain toward a Being in the world, Deleuze and Guattari 
(1994) argue that there is no brain behind the brain. It is the brain that thinks, not 
the mind or the person, as such. This is a theoretical move that is seemingly 
counter to a tradition in the humanities that has either ignored affect or more 
recently tried to situate it as something that is guided by human meaning 
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making, discourse and ideology (Wetherell, 2012). In this tradition the 
vulnerability to various encounters with capitalism (and microfascism) is, as 
follows, grasped as nothing short of an ideological illusion that shapes belief, as 
such. However, via Deleuze and Guattari, and Tarde, the tendency to sleepwalk 
toward a repressive subjectification is inversely understood as a reconfigured 
illusion in which beliefs are engendered by desire. 
Due to its engagement with neurology certain aspects of this approach will most 
probably trouble theoretical perspectives that maintain the rigidity of a divide 
between culture and biology. However, while it is important to retain a sense of 
criticality when approaching the hyperbole and speculative nature of 
neuroscientific enquiries into the biological brain, it is equally important to 
acknowledge the hypothetical nature of both sides of this divide. This article 
therefore concludes with a brief footnote concerning the potential of a more 
productive interference established between the opposing models of the brain 
adopted in representational and nonrepresentational theory. In place of the thick 
line often drawn between the representational spaces of discourse, meaning and 
ideology, on one hand, and nonrepresentation and affect, on the other, the 
discussion concludes by drawing on Henri Bergson’s (1911: 52-53) notion of an 
insensible degree of separation between affect and representational space to help 
to briefly reconfigure the relation between desire, belief and illusion. 
Everybody’s happy now; in everybody else’s way 
‘Don’t you wish you were free, Lenina?’ 
‘I don’t know what you mean. I am free. Free to have the most wonderful time. 
Everybody’s happy nowadays’. 
[Bernard Marx] laughed, ‘Yes, “Everybody’s happy nowadays”…But wouldn’t you 
like to be free to be happy in some other way, Lenina? In your own way, for 
example; not in everybody else’s way’. (Huxley, 2007: 79) 
A dystopian interpretation of social media begins by conceding that most people 
probably get an enormous amount of pleasure from their time on platforms like 
Facebook. There might be certain anxieties over how many ‘friends’ or ‘likes’ a 
person has acquired, but social media evidently provides fun and idiocy in equal 
measure (Goriunova, 2012). So the kind of user manipulation social media 
companies engage in needs to be grasped as part of a dystopian trajectory that a 
large percentage of the population are seemingly happy to go along with. Indeed, 
the exploitation of affective states associated with emotions like happiness is 
significant here since, on one hand, susceptibility to the suggestions of marketers 
is not arrived through cognitive processes alone, but coincides, to a great extent, 
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with noncognitive encounters associated with joy, and on the other hand, joyful 
encounters do not simply lead to the sharing of more joy, but also become part of 
an affective contagion eliciting conformity and entrainment. There is, like this, a 
joyful kind of collective encounter occurring in social media manipulation that is 
comparable in many ways to the rhythmic refrain central to that which controls 
Huxley’s Brave new worlders: that is, everybody’s happy nowadays – in everybody 
else’s way.  
Other emotions are evidently triggered by this rhythmic refrain. But mass fear, 
anxiety, hatred and jealously are perhaps merely in the service of the 
subjectification of Huxley’s ‘happy, hard-working, goods-consuming citizen’ 
(ibid.: 208). It is for this reason too that social media makes for an ideal test bed, 
or nursery, for cultivating, triggering and potentially steering joyful emotional 
contagions toward some predefined consumer-driven goals. Certainly, distinct 
from mass broadcast media, which proved to be an effective means of spreading 
emotions from the 1930s onward, the users of these networks are more 
predisposed, it would seem, to share their joyful experiences in exchange for the 
tools that allow them to freely do so; to post silly cat images, update profiles, to 
‘like’, to ‘share’, to ‘retweet’, to ‘upvote’, and so on. Given the right tools, people 
become, as William S. Burroughs (1985) wrote in an essay in the mid-1970s, a 
controlled population who are happy to turn themselves on. Evidently, despite 
the controversy surrounding the Facebook experiment, many users of Facebook 
will be blissfully oblivious to (or perhaps not at all troubled by) their participation 
in their own manipulation, or indeed, the many other attempts to trigger the 
emotional contagions they become (involuntarily) engaged in.  
Current efforts by social media enterprises to steer affective contagion also 
resonate with Huxley’s interest in the potential of brain conditioning beyond the 
dystopian novel. In an effort to evaluate the extent to which his dystopian 
universe of control had become a reality in the late 1950s, Huxley revisited the 
themes that had obsessed him in the early 1930s, including the potential 
manipulation of social relations through propaganda, brainwashing, hypnosis 
and chemical persuasion (Huxley, 1962). The eventual realization of a scientific 
revolution of control, he contended, would be underpinned by widespread 
Pavlovian conditioning of behaviour. However, beyond the physical stimulation 
of behaviour in Brave new world we find a brain that becomes the sum of all the 
suggestions made to it. This is an affective suggestibility, it would seem, that 
expands on Pavlov to consider emotional conditioning as a means to influence 
belief. Indeed, Huxley’s hypnotic suggestions are mass-produced by the College 
of Emotional Engineering (CEE), located in the same building as the Bureaux of 
Propaganda (Huxley, 2007: 56). Helmholtz Watson spends his time in CEE 
between lectures writing hypnopædic rhymes. Assisted by the intoxicating effects 
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of Soma, the emotional content of these rhymes becomes the mental stuff by 
which the intentions of the Brave new worlders are shaped. These rhymes tap 
into affective states by way of the aesthetic power of repetitive drums, and 
harmonious chords. It is the gut-brain that hears, not the ears (ibid.: 69). The 
recurring harmonies and repetitive words haunted the passions before they 
infected the mind (ibid.). It is these appeals to affective states that repress the 
population by quelling any misguided thoughts toward nonconformity.  
Ford, we are twelve; oh, make us one, 
Like drops within the Social River; 
Oh, make us now together run 
As swiftly as thy shining Flivver  
(ibid.: 70) 
Ostensibly, there is nothing particularly new in Facebook’s recent endeavour to 
steer intent by exploiting the contagious emotional desires of a population. The 
history of marketing is strewn with similar attempts to do so. St Elmo Lewis’s 
Attention, Interest, Desire and Action model (AIDA), a prominent template for 
suggestible advertising developed in the late nineteenth century, made explicit 
the practical necessity to bring together desire and cognitive beliefs (Heath, 2012: 
16-16). Similarly, in the 1920s, Freud’s nephew, Edward Bernays (1928), 
notoriously made the connection between unconscious desires, attention and the 
selling of products to the masses in his marketing propaganda model. To be 
sure, the syllabus of any self-respecting emotional engineering degree must 
surely include a history of response and instrumental conditioning techniques; 
emphasizing the important role of Pavlov, Watson and Skinner, but also bringing 
in Bernays’s model to illustrate the efficacy of emotional manipulation in 
marketing. Like this, Bernays well understood the leap from the mere 
conditioning of habitual responses and reaction psychology (behaviourism) to a 
propaganda model focused on the creation of ‘circumstances which will swing 
emotional [and psychological] currents so as to make for purchaser demand’ 
(ibid.: 52-54). Indeed, these emotional currents also include tapping into a desire 
for an authority figure of some kind. As Helmholtz might recount in one of his 
lectures at CEE; the salesman who wanted us to ‘eat more bacon’ would persuade 
us not because his bacon was the cheapest, or indeed the best, but because the 
doctor, who recommends the bacon, becomes a conditioning stimulus that feeds 
on this desire for authority. There needs to be, in other words, a complete circuit 
of conditioning of desires and beliefs in place to assure at least some level of 
certainly that more bacon will be sold. 
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The emotional turn  
The difference between these old marketing models and the current effort to tap 
into affective registers is arguably twofold. Firstly, new technologies, like those 
that allow for massive-scale emotion research carried out on big data samples, as 
well as biofeedback and brainwave measuring tools intended to detect the visceral 
stirrings assumed to lead to emotional engagements that inform purchase intent, 
are now widespread in marketing. Secondly, the focus on Pavlovian brain 
conditioning has been influenced by a continuously shifting theoretical frame in 
the brain sciences, beginning with the opening up of the black box of 
behaviourism to cognitive brain modelling, but now increasingly emphasising 
the significant role emotions play in decision making processes. To be sure, 
since the mid-1990s, the neurosciences have gradually moved away from a 
purely cognitive based approach to the brain-mind problem toward an enquiry 
into the affective, emotive and feely triggers assumed to be enmeshed in the 
networks between somatic markers and pure reason (Damasio, 2006). The 
neuroscientific argument forwarded suggests that the perturbations and 
disturbances of somatic sensations elicited by certain feelings – predominantly 
fear – can be subjected to response conditioning. There is an attempt, in the 
work of Joseph LeDoux (2003), for example, to demonstrate how a lab rat’s 
amygdalae provokes a rapid response based not on cognitive, but emotional 
information processes (ibid.: 120-124). Using Pavlovian conditioning LeDoux 
points to a pathway that he contends fear travels through, from an input zone 
(the lateral amygdala) with connections to most other regions in the amygdala, to 
the central nucleus, which functions as an output zone connected to networks 
that control fear behaviours, like freezing, and associated changes in body 
physiology; heart rate, blood pressure etc. (ibid.).  
Underpinned by similar ideas promoted in neuroeconomics, which correlate 
changes in brain chemistry to economic decision making, neuromarketing 
further attempts to go beyond a system of deciding that regards cognitive 
preferences as a given to explore the hedonic motivations exhibited by 
neurotransmitters thought to guide choice. It is, for example, supposed that 
dopamine updates the value an organism assigns to stimuli and actions, 
determining, some argue, the probability of a choice being made (Caplin and 
Dean, 2008). Like this, neuroeconomic propositions point toward the potential 
involvement of dopamine in the formation of expectations, beliefs and 
preferences (assuming, that is to say, that expectations, beliefs and preferences 
do not conversely affect dopamine activity). 
If these kinds of neuroscientific suppositions concerning the processing of 
emotion have any credence at all, they will evidently challenge two canonical 
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postulations at the heart of classical economics and persuasion theory. On one 
hand, the assumption that economic decisions are somehow guided by purely 
rational, utilitarian actors, rendered free from irrational emotions, becomes 
exposed to the uncertainties of a reasoning caught somewhere in between 
cognition and affect. On the other hand, the emotional brain thesis also 
challenges the Machiavellian notion that fear is the most powerful means of 
social influence. A neuroeconomist or neuromarketer might, for example, want 
to know what makes someone happy before a choice is made, since this state of 
mind can similarly affect options. 
Notwithstanding well-founded accusations of copious fMRI-driven 
neurospeculation (Satel and Lilienfeld, 2013), the influence of the emotion turn 
on the marketing industry has, without doubt, been considerable. Whether or not 
these neuroscientific ideas have any validity is entirely up for grabs, but they have 
certainly become very well-rehearsed in a circuitous convergence between the 
neurosciences and the marketing industry. LeDoux and Antonio Damasio are 
often cited in marketing literature, which, for example, claims to understand 
what makes a web user want to unconsciously click on certain content by 
recourse to emotional brain functioning (e.g. Weinschenk, 2009). 
Neuroscientists have also readily engaged with the burgeoning business of 
neuromarketing with Damasio, for example, providing the keynote at the 2014 
Neuromarketing World Forum in New York. There is an irresistible temptation, 
it seems, to draw on the emotional turn to grasp how the attention and 
(purchase) intentions of a consumer in a supermarket or on a website might be 
automatically guided toward specific goals. So beyond the hype of fMRI 
speculation, neuromarketing can be understood as a model of persuasion, in the 
tradition of Bernays, which appropriates emotional desires by way of 
conditioning reward systems and affective appeals. The aim of social media 
research like that carried out by Facebook is to similarly make the emotional stuff 
that motivates people to consume certain products and brands more predictable, 
and consequently more efficiently reproducible and spreadable.  
At its most dystopic, the appropriation of the emotional turn by marketers can be 
seen as a component of affective capitalism with the potential to manage sensory 
environments by way of producing a stream of sensory stimuli that conforms the 
mechanical habits of the consumer to predictable temporal behavioural patterns. 
This is a mode of affective control quantized by the refrain of habitual social 
media usage, and assembled in the rhythmic entrainment of brain frequencies, 
which, at the same time, threaten to transform active populations into a passive, 
docile consumer-proletariat. 
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Strength through joy  
The joyful encounter has its modern political origins in the fascisms of the late 
1920s and 1930s, and in particular the Nazi propaganda machine which 
thoroughly grasped the purchase of appeals to pleasure as well as fear. The 
encounters they produced were carefully assembled experiences that tapped into 
the desires of the crowd. Both Hitler and Mussolini were apparently well 
acquainted with the late nineteenth century crowd theories of Gustave Le Bon 
(2002/1895) and not surprisingly they endeavoured to draw on his notion of 
hypnotic mass suggestion as a mode of control. To be sure, the many direct 
appeals to desire fit squarely with Tarde’s more exacting microsociology of the 
crowd, particularly his idea that the object of the desires of the social sleepwalker 
are always belief (Sampson, 2012: 122). That is to say, to make a population 
believe in fascism it was necessary to appeal directly to desires for joyful 
sensations as well maintain atmospheres of absolute terror. Like this, the large 
scale state run leisure organization, Kraft durch Freude (Strength through joy) 
demonstrated how the Nazis placed a heavy emphasis on the happiness of the 
population and its desire to have a good life so that they would associate these 
feelings of joy with the new order (Fritzschep, 2009: 61). Again, this was not so 
much an ideological trick working directly on belief systems as it was an attempt 
at tapping into the crowd’s vulnerability to mass suggestion experienced through 
joyful encounters.  
By way of providing a theoretical insight into the affective politics of Nazis joy, 
Protevi (2010) draws attention to an affective brain-somatic relation that 
negotiates the world through ‘feeling what [people] can and cannot do in a 
particular situation’ (ibid.: 180). This is affective political power that can be 
comprehended here as a double event of the affective encounter: the capacity for a 
body to affect and be affected by its environment (Deleuze and Guattari, 1987: 
257). On one hand, the passive register (to be affected) is grasped politically as an 
example of pouvoir; a bodily encounter in the world similar in many ways to the 
kind of imitative encounter established between the social somnambulist and the 
power dynamic of an action-at-a-distance described by Tarde (Sampson, 2012: 30). 
Indeed, it is the passive encounters of a desiring population with a controlling 
transcendent fascistic leader that seems to lead to a desire for mass repression. 
On the other hand, the active register (to affect) is an encounter determined by 
what Protevi (2010: 182) calls ‘mutually empowering connections’. Political 
power as puissance is equal to ‘immanent self-organization’, ‘direct democracy’, 
and ‘people working together to generate the structures of their social life’ (ibid.). 
Is it, in other words, an active joyous affect, increasing the puissance of the 
bodies that pass through the sensory environment, enabling them to form new 
and mutually empowering encounters outside the original encounter (ibid.). 
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Thinking through the oppositional tensions of this double event, Protevi raises 
important questions concerning the multiple processes of subjectification 
occurring in politically organized affective encounters with the Nazis at the 
Nuremberg rallies. These large-scale militarized events provided a stimulating 
sensory environment that can be ethically gauged according to a kind of pouvoir 
that elicits passive joy, while, at the same time, enforcing the rhythmic 
entrainment and repression of the crowd. As Protevi puts it: 
The Nuremberg rallies were filled with joyous affect, but this joy of being swept up 
into an emergent body politic was passive. The Nazis were stratified; their joy was 
triggered by the presence of a transcendent figure manipulating symbols – flags 
and faces – and by the imposition of a rhythm or a forced entrainment – marches 
and salutes and songs. Upon leaving the rally, they had no autonomous power 
(puissance) to make mutually empowering connections. In fact, they could only feel 
sad at being isolated, removed from the thrilling presence of the leader. (Protevi, 
2010: 180) 
The marketers of early fascist joy also understood that conventional party politics, 
or indeed totalitarianism, was never going to be something that the population 
desired. Much better to appeal to the desire to oppose the established political 
order than it is to appear to personify it. In the early years of Italian fascism 
Mussolini purposefully positioned his fascism as the ‘anti-party’ (Obsolete 
Capitalism, 2015: v) so as to appeal directly to the disaffected working class desire 
to disrupt. This is an example of a passive joyful encounter since it seems to offer 
power to those without access to political resources. However, despite initially 
appealing to productive desires for change, fascism of this kind does nothing 
more than exacerbate the repression of the masses. 
Right wing populism: Waking the somnambulist in 2015 
Farage…comes along and people connect to him because he sounds like the guy in the 
street – Canvey Island Independent Party member explaining the appeal of the UK 
Independence Party’s leader in Essex. (BBC Sunday Politics, 19 October, 2014) 
The disempowering encounters with Nazi joy are comparable in many ways to a 
fascistic trajectory persisting in current waves of right wing populist contagion 
spreading throughout Europe at this point in time; a disparate series of political 
movements, which similarly position themselves as anti-parties opposed to the 
established order. Once again these attempts to position far right politics as a 
radical movement add up to more than a mere ideological trick by a totalitarian 
military machine. There is a far more complex and subtle relation established 
between desire and belief: a relation that has many continuities and 
discontinuities with the past. To begin with, although the entraining rhythms of 
marching and salutes have, for the most part, faded into the background (for the 
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time being, that is), the entrainment of the population by way of affective appeals 
to feelings about nationhood, race, and unity, persists. Moreover, this is a right 
wing populism stimulated by affective encounters intended not only to destroy 
difference and celebrate sameness, but also produce repression through joy. Not 
surprisingly then many theorists have revisited Wilhelm Reich’s question 
concerning why it is that so many people seek their own repression under 
regimes with political motivations that are palpably counter to their own self-
interest (Protevi, 2010: 178). As Reich put it:  
What was it in the masses that caused them to follow a party the aims of which 
were, objectively and subjectively, strictly at variance with their own interests? 
(Reich, 1946: 34) 
Indeed, we need to ask why, again, today, so many people desire pouvoir over 
puissance. They seem to be wide awake. They do not appear to be deceived. 
Nevertheless, it is not freedom that the sleepwalking supporters of right wing 
populism desire; it is repression. They are, once again, in need; it would seem, of 
a transcendent authority to protect them from what they are told is the chaos of 
an economic depression worsened by porous national borders open to floods of 
virus ridden immigrants steeling jobs, scrounging welfare and intent on acts of 
terror. That is, as well as having someone to blame for their own 
disempowerment, they crave an authority figure to relate to; someone who 
personifies prejudicial beliefs and anxieties stirred into action by a fear of the 
unfamiliar. So where amid all these appeals to the fear of otherness is the joyful 
encounter? To answer this question there is a need to, on one hand, rethink the 
sex-economic sociological framework in which Reich framed his original 
question; that is to say, to move on from its recourse to the inner world of an 
unconscious mind rooted in biological drives, and address, instead, the affective 
relations established between the population and the sensory environments that 
situated it. What seemed to Reich to be the perverse impulses of the fascist 
unconscious; a desire for repression of biological impulses that seeps through 
the layering of the unconscious into conscious rational choices needs to be 
revisited in terms of a political affect that stirs into action a different kind of mass 
somnambulism. This is not a hidden unconscious seeping out from the inside. 
Affect is not a fantasy. The sleepwalker is already out there; in the crowd; the guy 
in the street. The somnambulist is a social relation. This is the kind of 
microfascism that is not simply personified by a transcendental leader either, but 
as Michel Foucault notes in his preface to Anti-Oedipus (Deleuze and Guattari 
1984), it is already in ‘everyday behavior’; it is ‘the fascism that causes us to love 
power, to desire the very thing that dominates and exploits us’ (Foucault, 1984: 
xiii). On the other hand, there is perhaps a need to revisit certain elements of the 
critique of Marxism Reich offered in the 1940s. Contrary to how the masses have 
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been generally observed through the lenses of Marxist theory, the working class 
supporters of these right wing movements did not appear to, as Reich argued, 
perceive themselves as a hard done by proletariat in opposition to bourgeois 
elites. As Reich contends, the working classes of the 1940s did not see 
themselves as the struggling class anymore. They had, he claims, grasped 
themselves as having ‘taken over the forms of living and the attitudes of the 
middle class’ (Reich, 1946: 55). 
Today, it would seem that the supporters of right wing populism have become 
particularly susceptible to differently orientated appeals to the felt experiences of 
a shifting sense of class identity to those Reich observed. That is, the working 
classes are now positioned as the disaffected guy in the street. This means they 
are once again drawn to the appeal of the anti-party since it seems to soak up a 
desire to disrupt order, but merely produces more repression. Moreover, desires 
are now shared in the digitally mediated sensory environments of social media; 
these digital crowds and data assemblages Facebook readily experiments with. 
Indeed, Obsolete Capitalism’s (2015, xx-xxxvii) analysis of the rise of the 
comedian Beppe Grillo’s popularist anti-party, the Five Star Movement in Italy, 
points to the emergence of a digital populism that acknowledges the central role 
of the marketer and net strategist in building the anti-party’s brand, orientating 
voters, and disrupting dissidents through social media.  
In many parts of Europe, there is a distinct reversal of the fortunes of Reich’s 
imagined upwardly mobile proletariat, which the right wing popularists in the 
UK are readily exploiting by way of joyful encounters. This is again not simply a 
trick of ideology played out on the ignorant masses. Like Grillo in Italy – the 
authoritarian hiding behind the rascally face of a showman (ibid.: x-xii) – we find 
that the bourgeois elites, secreted away behind the facade of these anti-parties, 
are endeavouring to pass themselves off as the guy in the street, or at least some 
jovial personality compatible with the contrivance of this imagined worldview. 
The UK Independence Party (UKIP), for example, were led by a privately 
educated, former stockbroker who is regularly filmed and photographed by the 
media sharing of a pint of beer in the local pub, creating an appealing impression 
that he is one of us.1 The production of these political ersatz experiences of joy 
cannot simply be attributed to an ideological appeal to a rigid sense of the 																																																								
1  Since writing this article the UKIP leader resigned after narrowly failing to win a seat 
in Parliament in the May 7th General Election in 2015. This is despite a significant 
swell in support for UKIP, which amounts to 13% of the national vote share. By the 
11th May, he was back; the party having refused to accept the showman’s resignation. 
In June 2016, Farage’s aim to ‘take his country back’ (to take the UK out of the 
European Union) was realized with many Brexit supporters saying that immigration 
was their main concern. Farage has since stood down as leader. 
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representation of class. The image of Nigel Farage swigging a pint in the local 
pub works in the insensible degrees between representational illusion and 
affective states that trigger the desire for mass repression; that is to say, they exist 
in the interferences between the desires and beliefs of a population. To be sure, it 
is the triggering of the latter affective states that seems to prompt contagious 
overspills of affect that are as much about joy as they are fear. Although a large 
percentage of the affective contagion of UKIP can evidently be put down to racist 
fear mongering over immigration, it is also the case that supporters of the right 
become vulnerable to joyful encounters with these showman-like leaders, which 
have been historically satisfied (e.g. in the UK) through right wing inventions like 
the Royal Family and Saatchi and Saatchi’s fabrication of the handbag swinging 
shopkeeper Margaret Thatcher. The fascist marketer has, like this, continued to 
perpetuate a sensory environment full of joyful encounters with congenial 
aesthetic figures: right wing buffoons, including the UKIP leader and the current 
London Mayor, Boris Johnson, whose jester-like performances obscure the 
inequity of power relations in the UK wherein the many are overwhelmingly 
dominated by an over privileged and privately educated few. Surely, the point is 
that the somnambulist needs to wake up! These buffoons are not one of us. 
Following Tarde’s microsociology, these global leaders should not be grasped as 
personifications collectively born (Tarde, 2012: 36). They are a monadological 
accumulation of facts (e.g. Farage likes a pint and Boris always says it how it is), 
which tend to assemble and resonate, not so much by accident, as Tarde 
contended, but by way of purposefully steered affects that spread through the 
sensory environments of the mass media and digital populism.  
Returning to the earlier focus on neurology, the affective marketing of right wing 
buffoons can perhaps be seen alongside a more generalized marketing of ersatz 
experiences in affective capitalism that stimulate a craving for sensory 
stimulation. Again, this is a regime of control that asks questions of conventional 
Marxist approaches. As Reich (1946: vii) points out, the ideal of abolishing 
private property, for example, seems to clash with a mass desire for commodities 
of all kinds. In the 1940s Reich listed such mundane items as shirts, pants, 
typewriters, toilet paper, books etc., but today we can add a far more sensorial list 
of luxury consumer items, including the much ridiculed working class obsession 
with wide screen TVs and access to social media entertainment systems that 
connect populations to an array of further joyful encounters. These are more 
than ideological weapons of mass distraction. Indeed, following Bruce E. 
Wexler’s brain and culture thesis (2008), the desire for joyful sensory 
stimulations of this kind can be conceived of as an addiction that exceeds the 
commodity fetish; the satisfying of which reduces the anxieties and depressions 
caused by sensory deprivation (ibid.: 83). Turning Wexler’s thesis on its head, it 
might even be argued that given the overwhelming control of sensory 
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stimulation by affective capitalism some level of deprivation might actually be a 
good thing. 
The brain is already free?  
We are living at the hour of neuronal liberation, and we do not know it. An agency 
within us gives sense to the code, and we do not know it. The difference between 
the brain and psychism is shrinking considerably, and we do not know it 
(Malabou, 2009: 8). 
In order to explore the potential of the joyful encounter as an expression of 
puissance this discussion now moves on to the second question of what can a 
brain do. To some extent then, we can begin by following Malabou’s endeavour to 
free the brain; that is to say, in this context, liberate the brain-somatic relation 
from its coincidence with the passive joyful encounters of affective capitalism. 
Like this, the discussion will now fleetingly follow Malabou’s effort to draw on 
theories from the emotional turn in the neurosciences concerning the emergence 
of a plastic protosubjectivity, which suggest that although we might not know it, 
our brain is already free; we just need to ‘free this freedom’ (ibid.: 11).  
What can we learn from Malabou’s appeal to the neurosciences so that we might 
better understand how to free the masses from this desire for repression? Firstly, 
Malabou draws attention to the emergence of a neuronal sense of self, which is, 
according to LeDoux, a unity, but not unitary (LeDoux, 2003: 31). Significantly 
then, the plasticity of the synaptic self is not regarded as a mere personality 
formed out of a genetic building block. It is rather ‘added to and subtracted 
from’; it is, like this, a plasticity of ‘genetic maturation, learning, forgetting, 
stress, aging, and disease’ (ibid.: 29). This plasticity is what Malabou importantly 
draws attention when she asks the question of what we should do with our 
brains. For this reason, we should not, she contends, be overly concerned about a 
genetically determined brain because the plastic brain provides a ‘possible 
margin of improvisation’ between the synapse and the biological encoding of 
genetic necessity (ibid.: 8). Secondly, the question of what can a brain do will also 
not be answered, Malabou argues, by yielding to a model of plasticity redefined 
as flexible; i.e. the flexible ergo docile consumers and workers of affective 
capitalism. Whereas the emotional brain is made from a liberated plasticity that 
can know and modify itself, flexibility is the avatar that masks and diverts 
attention away from the affordances of freedom that plasticity might offer. ‘This 
means asking not “to what point are we flexible?” but rather “To what extent are 
we plastic?”’ (ibid.: 14). The problem, for Malabou, is that in its coincidence with 
capitalism the brain is ‘entirely ignorant of plasticity but not at all of flexibility’ 
(ibid.: 12). 
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Where this article subtly deviates from Malabou’s use of the emotional brain is in 
her contention that our brain is us; that is, ‘We’ coincide with ‘our brain’ (ibid.: 
8). To be sure, the search for a liberated protosubjectivity does not begin, I 
contend, with an ‘organic personality’ (ibid.). This is neither a quest for a stable 
sense of self-identity or individual freedom. Indeed, despite the emotional brain 
having a diachronic temporality, the improvisation between gene power and 
plastic variability is disappointingly grasped as a dialectical movement by 
Malabou; that is to say, it is a ‘synthesis of all the plastic processes at work in the 
brain’, allowing the organism to ‘hold together and unify the cartography of 
networks’ (ibid.: 58). The emergence of stable thoughts, emotions and 
motivations becomes, like this, necessary for the survival of a coherent and 
rational neuronal personality; otherwise irrationality would cast these thoughts 
out into the wilderness, and emotions and motivations would be scattered in all 
directions like some ‘unruly mob’ (ibid.). This scattering is, nonetheless, where we 
might begin to confront the neoliberal production of flexible individuals; in the 
animal-like collectivities of what we might call the crowd-brain, which as Tarde 
argued, has a potential for revolution rather than joyful repression. 
Furthermore, the aim here is not simply a matter of uncovering particular 
hidden brain regions or plastic processes so as to establish the sum total of who 
we are, but rather, primarily, about awakening a collective political consciousness 
from its somnolent coincidence with the spirit of capitalism. As follows, the 
crowd-brain never becomes a sum total. Arguably, it is a collective freedom that 
will not be achieved by looking inside the brain to establish the relation the ‘I’ has 
to an external world. The crowd-brain is a multiplicity of relational patterns. All 
too often in phenomenological tendencies in psychology and brain science the 
outside becomes nothing more than a model represented in the inner world. 
Boundary lines are produced between self, others and the environments in which 
they relate. In contrast, the intention here is to open up sense making process to 
the borderless outside forces of pattern and relationality. Indeed, if we are to 
progress to ‘free this freedom’ (Malabou 2009: 11), then it is perhaps better to 
ask how brains relate to sensory environments in which self and other become 
indistinguishable instead of looking inside the synapse to find out how a brain. 
To even begin to free this freedom, it is important to move on from the tendency 
to conceptualize subjectivity (or the emergence of self) as a readymade Being in 
the world. The enlightenment concept of an emergent selfhood – Descartes’ 
essence of human subjectivity – and the theoretical structures that support the 
model of a synaptic self have a lot in common in this sense (Bennett and Hacker, 
2013). Indeed, both seem to be in service of neoliberal subjectification. Rather 
than stay focused then on the inner world of subjective perception and opinion, I 
want to grasp subjectification in the multiple processes of becoming. As Deleuze 
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and Guattari (1994) contend, the brain-becoming-subject is to be found in its 
encounter with infinity, not in a readymade personality, soul or self-identity on 
the inside, but by plunging into the chaos outside. 
Radical relationality 
Before concluding this paper, I want to bring together two theoretical approaches 
that tease out the affective politics of this notion of an outside. The first works to 
erode the border between self, other and sensory environment, allowing for a 
potential education of the senses alert to the affective appeals to joy that occur in 
relations to exteriority. The second places the temporal rhythms of Tarde’s 
imitation-repetition as the base of all social relationality; that is to say, it is a 
desire to imitate, and not the sharing of meaning or ideology, that brings the 
crowd-brain together. 
To begin with, and following Protevi’s (2010) reading of Wexler’s book Brain and 
culture (2008), we see how the inside/outside relation established in the 
emotional brain model is substituted for a ‘radical relationality’(ibid.: 174-76), 
which helps us to theorize relations to exteriority in a number of significant ways. 
Firstly, Wexler notes how neuroplasticity becomes open to varying degrees of 
change, over time, occurring in a neuro-environmental emergentism; that is, the 
intricate connections and patterns established between neurons are ‘determined 
by sensory stimulation and other aspects of environmentally induced neural 
activity’ (Wexler, 2008: 22). Importantly, this notion of emergence not only 
differs from the model of the inner world presented in the emotional brain 
model, but also significantly contrasts with other models of a centred self-
identity, conceived of by, for example, the phenomenological neurophilosopher, 
Thomas Metzinger (2009). Like this, Metzinger argues that evolutionary 
pressures have introduced a further level of duality between an illusory inner 
dream state that hallucinates an objective reality far too complex to contemplate. 
Secondly, and relatedly, radical relationality subtly reverses the notion of a 
selfhood trapped in the cranium, making the essence of subjective experience, 
not objective reality, illusory. In other words, the sense of self (the assumed 
substantive part of who we are) is the imagined outcome of the speed of sensory 
processing being too slow to perceive anything more than the self as an 
individuated substance embedded in the brain. So, rather than rendering the 
brain an individuated substance, bequeathed with fixed properties (real or 
imagined), Protevi (2010: 176) contends that subjectivity is made in the tendency 
to partake in a pattern of social interaction. It is not, therefore, the virtuality of 
the individuated self that determines how the social field is perceived, but rather 
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‘the interaction of intensive individuation processes that forms the contours of 
the virtual field’ (ibid.: 73). Thirdly, Wexler’s radical relationality shifts this 
substance viewpoint (seeing the outside world from the inside) to a novel 
perspective in which what is internalized becomes a ‘pattern of interaction’. This 
is a radical relationality because as Wexler writes: 
The relationship between the individual and the environment is so extensive that it 
almost overstates the distinction between the two to speak of a relation at all 
(Wexler, 2008: 39). 
Brains and bodies are thusly in constant processual exchanges with their sensory 
environments, which, although appearing to be masked by an individual’s 
‘exaggerated sense of independence’ (carried in a fleeting memory that considers 
our uniqueness to be a property of who we are), nevertheless, makes us little 
more than an effect of the milieu (ibid.: 39-40). Therefore, what Protevi 
significantly extracts from Wexler’s plastic brain thesis is an emergent 
subjectivity; not understood as the outcome of complex malleable brain 
functions, but from a ‘differentiated system in which brain, body, and world are 
linked in interactive loops’ (Protevi, 2010: 173). Wexler’s entire project is 
consequently underlined by his intention to 
...minimize the boundary between the brain and its sensory environment, and 
establish a view of human beings as inextricably linked to their worlds by nearly 
incessant multimodal processing of sensory information. (Protevi, 2010: 173; 
Wexler, 2008: 9) 
Lastly, and in addition to Protevi’s reading, Wexler foregrounds the ubiquity and 
automaticity of imitative processes as key to understanding subjectivity in the 
making as an effect of the sensory environment (Wexler, 2008: 113-21). As 
Wexler puts it, imitation is ‘consistently operative throughout the moment-to-
moment unfolding of everyday life’ (ibid.: 115). It is, for example, through the 
close bonds a child makes with a range of caregivers that the imitation of 
example persists through social relations. The extent to which the imitation of 
example occupies the interactive loops that compose subjectivity in the making 
suggests a distinctive Tardean aspect to Wexler’s sensory environment that needs 
to be unpacked. 
The imitative rhythms of radical relationality 
The significant imitative quality of radical relationality can be usefully mapped 
onto Christian Borch’s (2005) observation of how the rhythmic intensity of 
Tarde’s imitation-suggestibility situates a population. There are indeed two 
aspects to Borch’s rhythmanalysis that can be taken forward in the context of this 
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discussion. That is, firstly, what comes together through imitation-repetition is 
not the unity of the One, but rather rhythm produces the harmony of the many; a 
harmonious relation between repetition and difference (ibid.: 93-94). The rhythm 
of imitative contagion does not therefore produce the stability of a self-contained 
spatial identity; a self fixed in a sum total, or systematic emergence of a whole 
self from which the materiality of the brain emerges on the outside (a soul, mind, 
a person, a model), but rather, secondly, denotes materiality in rhythmic 
movement. Importantly, I think, this is not an emergence of subjectivity that 
climbs a flight of steps leading from a neuronal micro level to a macro level of 
consciousness, but an unfolding rhythmic movement of relations passing 
through a sensory environment.  
Adding a neurological dimension to Borch’s rhythmanalysis we get to see the 
significant role imitation might play in the political positioning of the brain-
becoming-subject. That is to say, the situating of brain-somatic relations in the 
spatiotemporal flows of the sensory environments they inhabit. As Borch puts it: 
[T]he individual does not exist prior to the rhythms but, on the contrary, is 
produced by them and their momentarily stabilized junctions, and since the 
subjectification of the individual therefore changes as the rhythms and their 
junctions change, rhythmanalysis is not merely a perspective on imitations per se, 
but equally a tool to demonstrate a society’s dominant ways of promoting subject 
positions. (ibid.: 94-95) 
Like this, Borch also draws specific attention to Tarde’s contention that 
environments, like rural communities and newly industrialized cities, acquire a 
‘very significant importance in what is actually…imitated’ (ibid.: 82). In Tarde’s 
era, cities produced new social formations, like the urban crowd, which unlike 
rural family communities, become powerful vectors for imitative flows of the 
inventions of fashion, crime, and potentially nonconformity and riotous 
assembly, for example. Here we find the apparent traces of the conservatism of a 
nineteenth century crowd theory, which feared the revolutionary contagions of 
the working classes. But it is also in these disruptive social fields that fascist 
contagions thrive. Indeed, Obsolete Capitalism (2015: xiii) makes a very useful 
connection here between the spread of the kind of microfascism Deleuze and 
Guattari linked to the rural, the city, the neighbourhood, the couple, the family, 
school and office, and Tarde’s microsociology. It is, within these Tardean 
microsociologies that we would, Deleuze and Guattari contend, answer the 
question of why desire longs for its own repression.  
The differences between the joyful encounters of 1930s fascism and today’s 
swing toward right wing populism may also be traced back to Tarde’s 
microsociologies of imitation. In times of rampant capitalist industrialization, 
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the brain-becoming-subject was transformed into a revolutionary crowd. This 
was also the kind of molecular sensory environment in which Brownshirts and 
Blackshirts of the anti-party thrived (Obsolete Capitalism, 2015: viii). Indeed, 
following Tarde we have to note the intensification of mediated relations in 
urban environments, beginning with rise of the press and telegraph networks. As 
follows the crowd, Tarde contends, become increasingly ‘disconnected from [the] 
physical co-presence’ of the urban environment (Borch, 2005: 96). Here we 
encounter the origins of a Tardean media theory in action. He would indeed 
upgrade the crowd-brain’s rhythmic encounter with the city to incorporate the 
introduction of mediated communications that create new publics, anticipating, 
in many ways, the progressive onset of the sensory environments of the mass 
media age. Newspapers, cinema, radio and television become component parts 
in the emergence of subsequent new media publics. To be sure, these newly 
mediated publics can be extended to contemporary post-industrial sensory 
environments, which play a significant role in once again rupturing harmony 
and repositioning subjects in the rhythmic flows of social media, for example. 
Although seemingly deterritorializing the co-presence of the crowd-brain and its 
urban environment, the ubiquitous Facebook brings together (reterritorializes) 
bodies and brains into nascent sensory terrains (data assemblages), which are, it 
would seem, ripe for the repressions of affective capitalism. 
The insensible degrees between representational illusion and affective 
encounter 
To better grasp affective capitalism one has to arguably invest in a theory of affect 
which, on one hand, leans to a certain extent on the sciences of the brain, and on 
the other, tries to find answers to the uncanniness of social relationality in 
concepts like imitation, crowd contagion, desiring assemblages, hypnosis etc. 
This double commitment does not, evidently, sit well with those in the 
humanities and social sciences who are, it seems, growing increasingly hostile to 
the positioning of affective states by nonrepresentational theorists as an 
alternative to discourse analysis and phenomenologically constructed 
subjectivities. No longer consigned to an incomprehensible fascination with the 
uncanny, nonrepresentational theory is accused of ‘draw[ing] a thick line between 
bodily movements or forces and social sense making’ (Wetherall, 2012: 19-21). 
What is essentially driving this altercation with those who are ‘rubbishing 
discourse’ is an endeavour to claim back affect theory as something that is 
‘inextricably linked’ to guiding forces of human meaning-making, the semiotic 
and the discursive (ibid.: 20), as well as the embodied essence of self forwarded 
by phenomenological accounts of affect (e.g. Blackman, 2012).  
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What would seem to be a more productive course of action in times of rampant 
affective capitalism and contagions of right wing populism is to rethink the 
relation established between belief and desire. In other words, get to grips with 
the tensions that exist between ideological illusions and desiring assemblages. 
Following Bergson (1911: 52-53), for example, (a nonrepresentational theorist who 
nevertheless grasped the insensible degrees between the unextended affective 
state of things and the ideas and images that represent and occupy them in 
space), we can begin to rethink the relation between affect and desire, on one 
hand, and ideological illusion and belief, on the other. Indeed, the interference 
between the brain sciences and the seemingly opposing philosophies behind 
representational and nonrepresentational theory are not as disparate as it might 
seem. When trying to make the implicit experiences of capitalism become 
explicit both demonstrate a commitment to neurology albeit with very different 
brain models and outcomes. On one hand, the interaction between capitalist 
visual cultures and a false consciousness rooted in representation requires a 
distinctly cognitive model of the brain. We might call it a locationist’s brain with 
special access to a secret photographic album. The ideology of capitalism is thus 
exposed by semiotic technologies like the sunglasses Žižek’s adopts in his film 
The perverts guide to ideology (2012). The revealing of implicit ideologies has a 
distinct violence to it. It involves the pealing back of ideological layers of myth 
making to make explicit the referent. This uncovering process might be achieved 
by staring directly into the light of the spectacle until it makes our eyes bleed or it 
requires these special shades that Žižek dons to expose the real by routing around 
the illusory.  
Nonrepresentational theory, on the other hand, is concerned with a different 
aspect of the brain-body chemistry’s response to the same mirage. This is an 
interaction with the smoke and mirrors that may not necessarily be seen, or 
indeed thought of, in the cognitive sense (located inside a brain that thinks in 
images). It relates instead to sensations, feelings, affect and imitative processes 
that do not have a location, as such, and get passed on in the ever-moving 
externality of affective atmospheres. However, it is important to consider that 
what is felt in the atmosphere of affect is crucially related to what we think, and 
in turn, what we believe. This may prove to be an altogether differently oriented 
kind of thinking that requires a very different brain model: an antilocationist 
brain. Perhaps these various manifestations of affective capitalism we encounter 
bypass belief altogether, appealing to desires that have a mind of their own. 
Finally then, whereas the representational theorist seems to have a clear sense of 
a relation between hidden symbols and conscious visible forms, as established in 
discursive language and semiotic regimes, affect theory needs to grasp what is 
often unimaginable. The nonrepresentational power of affective capitalism 
ephemera: theory & politics in organization  16(4): 51-74 
72 | article  
becomes manifest in asignifying and prediscursive forces, like those grasped in 
the radical, imitative relationality established between brains, bodies and sensory 
environment, which, like signification and discourse, suggest, persuade and 
subjectify, but there is an indiscernibility that requires a subtler kind of violent 
disclosure. Žižek’s Sunglasses will not protect us from the imitative radiation of 
affective capitalism. Conceivably a more effective mode of protection from the 
joyful encounters that work on desire, infect belief and lead to repression, might 
be a sun blocker of some kind. 
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